It was summer 1955. We decided to meet up again the following Easter at Ingleton. So in 1956, after exploring a few caves around Ingleton and Clapham, we decided to form ourselves into a proper group. It was August-September 1956 we held a meeting in the Wheatsheaf Hotel, Ingleton.

One of the greatest defects in the rescue operation at that time had been the failure to establish reliable communications between the entrance and Rough Chamber and beyond. These communications were the more essential in view of the flood scare which parties had had on the previous day. Therefore, every effort was made to provide the parties working underground with the maximum security which we could achieve. Massive reinforcement of the dam was undertaken, and Harold Lord of the Derbyshire Rescue Organisation provided a very efficient transistorised telephone system which was used to provide a service to Rough Chamber and later as far as Kneewrecker Junction.

Security having been established, parties were then despatched to make a detailed search of the extremities of the Marathon Series in an attempt to locate the body of the sixth man who, it was thought, may have been swept further into the cave by the high pressure waters.

Dave and Alan Brook and Dave Howitt of U.L.S.A. with three others entered the cave about 14.00 hrs. They reached the end of the phone at Kneewrecker Junction in about 50 minutes and some 3-4 hours later they reported back to the effect that no sixth body had been found despite an intensive search of the far parts of the cave. Identification of the five bodies had been made but John Ogden had not been found.

The Brook brothers and Dave Howitt were known to have a most detailed knowledge of the remote parts of the cave and it did not seem likely that they would have missed anything. Therefore, it had to be concluded that Ogden's body was either in the Marathon Passage or possibly in some nearer part of the system. The latter possibility did not appear very likely but had to be considered and steps were taken to search other parts of the cave with the idea that Ogden might have been on the way out in front of the others when the flood struck. Also, a further party which included Ken Pearce and Dr. Hugh Kidd of Derbyshire Cave Rescue Organisation and Tony Salmon of U.L.S.A., went in to consider the feasibility of bringing the bodies out of the cave and to legally establish the cause of death. The Brooks party arrived at the surface at about 19.30 hrs. bringing with them a number of items for identification amongst which was a piece of wet suiting which did not appear to belong to any of the other bodies and was subsequently identified as having come from Ogden's suit. Dr. Kidd and party surfaced at about 21.00 hrs. and reported that they had failed to find any sign of Ogden and also that they considered the task of retrieving the bodies was unreasonable in view of the labour and risk to personnel it would involve.

A third search party led by Brian Boardman (C.R.O.) entered the cave at 22.00 hrs with instructions to search a number of minor side passages opening off the Near and Far Marathon Passages. At 03.10 hrs. on Wednesday morning Boardman reported that, whilst making an examination of the area in which three of the bodies had been found, he had located what he believed to be the body of John Ogden, jammed vertically in an extremely tight rift only some 15 feet from the other three, but so covered with silt that only the boots, socks, laces and a part of a white helmet were visible. He had been unable to get a closer view, but the details which he was able to give agreed with the clothing Ogden was known to be wearing; thus, in part by a process of elimination John Ogden too was found drowned.

The tragedy was complete, six of our friends, six most experienced cavers, had all died together, suddenly, and in terrifying circumstances. We had always feared the consequences of a severe flood in Mossdale, yet would never have believed we would live to see the day, nor have believed the enormity of the truth.

Our determination now was to see that the bodies of our friends were, in some manner, and with respect, buried within the cave rather than left to the uncertainties of recurrent floodings. Mostly we accepted the unreasonableness of any attempt to bring them out; a project which would certainly have taxed our resources beyond realistic limits. However, it was clear that the burial of the bodies within a readily accessible blind side aven, which lies close to where four of the victims were found, was a perfectly reasonable and practical proposition, given the further support of the rescue teams and the maintenance of the dam and diversion channel. Support from the already fatigued rescue teams was immediately forthcoming; three teams of six men each were organised for the morning to undertake this arduous and distressing task and steps were taken to arrange for the aven to be sealed off and a memorial plaque placed within the cave.

By 09.00 hrs on the Wednesday, tired and still rather shocked men were greeted by rain, and a forecast of more to come; everyone waited. Then the on-lookers slowly filtered away and it became clear that the official intention was to withdraw support from any further activity within the cave. Accordingly a direct approach was made to the police at the scene with the request that the dam and diversion channel be maintained until such time as the weather conditions would reasonably permit the burial to be carried out. This request was rejected pending the decision of the Craven Coroner who, it was reported, would shortly be visiting the scene. Meanwhile support trickled away, and by 17.00 hrs when the Coroner finally appeared it was clear that there was insufficient manpower to complete the task in safety, even if the weather conditions had been favourable, and permission had been forthcoming.

At this time any further persons were prohibited from entering the cave for any purpose, including the recovery of some of the communications equipment. This step was taken by the police officers present, presumably acting on the decision of the Coroner. A considerable amount of unrest and dissatisfaction was felt by many of the rescue personnel, since understandably they felt that their best intentions were being frustrated. After some discussion with the Coroner to establish the location of the bodies and to confirm the rescuers opinion that retrieval of the bodies not realistic, it was decided that boulder obstruction should be placed in the New Entrance to prevent any unofficial entry of the cave. It was also stated that the earthworks and diversion channel would have to be removed by request of the landowner. It became quite clear that no further support for underground action could be expected from the police in charge. With the weather becoming very wet everyone withdrew from the scene, but many people still had every intention of taking steps to complete the task at the earliest possible opportunity.

In anticipation of this move it appears that instructions were given to prevent any further entry of the cave by the immediate removal of the dam and diversion channel and the 'sealing' of the New Entrance with concrete and boulders. This was carried out the following day, as far as the writer is aware in the absence of any further consultation with the rescue organisations or other persons with special knowledge of the cave; the dam was removed and the diversion channel filled in. Officially the cave had been 'sealed' and this was widely reported in the press.

The precipitate action taken in the 'permanent' blocking of the New Entrance to Mossdale and the removal of the diversion channel at once created new problems which had not been appreciated by the rescuers, police or Coroner during the short consultations on the Wednesday afternoon. The most serious consequence was that the potential rescue hazard created by the closure of the New Entrance was vastly more severe than previously. The Lavatory Basin (Old) Entrance was still open and would be difficult to close, and although it had not been a usual method of entering the cave in recent times, it was perfectly negotiable in low water conditions. However, in high water it would very quickly become impassable, leading to the risk of persons becoming trapped under conditions in which entry and exit via the now closed New Entrance would have been perfectly reasonable. It was known to be very likely that additional entrances to the cave could be made at a number of other points in the 250 feet of shattered and unstable cliff face. Moreover, any such additional entrances would be more hazardous from the flood-trap point of view than the entrance which had now been closed. To attempt to seal off all 'possible' entrances to the system from the scar face or elsewhere is not thought to be a reasonable proposition and in the event of any party of cavers 'going missing' in the area or any actual situation requiring entry by search and rescue teams to this 5 mile system, these persons will at present be faced with a much more difficult and dangerous task than hitherto. Against this background there was the deep feeling of frustration and bitterness felt by all those who had worked so long and hard at the rescue attempt. Enormous effort by both men and machines had been expended in making the cave safe for rescue purposes and, apparently without any further detailed discussion with rescuers and cavers, this had been removed leaving a situation in which the cave is far more dangerous than previously and also effectively preventing any move towards a decent burial of the dead. Several attempts to negotiate at the official level were made at once but were all rebuffed, 'pending the inquest'.

The inquest was held in Skipton in July. A number of important facts emerged; notably the report of the Meteorological Office at Bawtry whose representative stated that they estimated that some 1.46 inches of rain fell in the Grassington area between 10.00 hrs on the Saturday and 10.00 on Sunday. Mr. L. Huff of U.W.F.R.A. in his report quotes rainfall figures obtained from Dr. G. Sweeting of Litton as being 0.75 inches between the hours of 17.00 and 20.00 on the Saturday. This was stated to be 'not unusual' and likely to occur in the month of June once in every one or two years. Further questioning revealed that some 95% of this fall occurred between 20.00 hrs, and midnight on the Saturday. Hence, there is no doubt that the rainfall which occurred was indeed exceptional even if it did not break any Met. Office records. Also, it was established that the party had consulted the weather forecast before entering the cave on the Saturday, and that they considered that the water levels at the Scar were very low at the time they entered the cave.

After a great deal of time had been spent establishing the identity and cause of death of the six men, the jury returned a verdict of 'Death by Misadventure' and added the rider that they considered the action taken by instruction of the Coroner (in sealing off the cave entrance) ‘to be a very wise one’. This verdict was returned by a jury of laymen who had not heard one word of evidence or expert opinion as to the possible consequences of this action on future access to the cave and the flood hazard involved. This was the more remarkable since prior to the inquest a statement making clear the rescue hazard which had been created by this closure had been circulated to the Coroner's Office, The West Riding Police, and The Home Office. The statement outlined the potential hazard, and recommended that the New Entrance to Mossdale should be opened, made safe, and gated with access to be closely controlled. This was arrived at after lengthy discussions with many of the rescue personnel, officials of the U.W.F.R.A., and had the formal support of both the B.S.A. and C.R.G. The existence of this expert opinion was ignored at the inquest, and subsequently a letter has been received from the Coroner's Office in which the views expressed are largely rejected and the authority of the writers questioned.

At the time of writing this seems to be where the matter rests, despite the fact that Mossdale Caverns are still accessible through the Old Entrance and hence presents a flood-trap danger far more severe than hitherto. Should such an emergency occur in the future, even if the New Entrance is re-opened, it is a sad reflection on all of us that there is no significantly greater chance of trapped cavers being rescued now than there was before the 24th June.

In 1953 a party of cavers became trapped in the Assembly Hall area of Mossdale as a result of the rise in level of Mossdale Beck, it did not rise to the levels which must have been reached on June 24th 1967, and the members of that party lived. Had the weather been otherwise it appears very likely that they would have been drowned. Following this incident the U.W.F.R.A. (in whose area Mossdale lies) approached the Fire Brigade for advice on the use of pumps in any future such emergency and they were told that the problem was far too great to be dealt with by this means; in the event this advice proved to be correct. Also, at that time, an approach was made to the presumed landowner of Mossdale, with a request to construct a diversion channel such as was done in June last. Permission was not given and it was pointed out that the diverted beck would flow onto other people's land. As a result of recent enquiries it has come to light that in fact Mossdale Scar and the cave entrance appear to lie on common land. In the event of the beck being diverted it would resume the course which, in recent geological times (Local information suggests that the beck has flowed past the Scar in recent historical times. The present cave entrances have arisen by stream capture, and this in turn has modified the existing passages.) it must have taken, traversing nothing but rough boggy moorland, to sink some quarter of a mile around the scarp of the hill.

Mossdale Caverns are officially 'sealed', the caves have become a tomb, five and a half miles long, and yet it is still possible to enter the system. It appears unlikely that it will ever be otherwise, nor, in the opinion of the writer, should it be. The caves remain; one of Britain's most extensive and complex systems. A fascinating example of a vast solutional network modified by vadose action all developed in a relatively thin limestone bed. We have scarcely begun to understand its complexities. It offers remarkable opportunities for the explorer and cave morphologist alike. I do not believe that it will remain "sealed" and unvisited for all time, and if parties of cavers start to re-visit the system more deaths are likely to occur unless action is taken now to ensure that it cannot happen again. There is only one effective form which such action can take, and this should be clear to the reader from what has been presented to him in this report. A permanent dam and diversion channel should be constructed at Mossdale to make the cave 'safe' for future generations of cavers and speleologists. The writer accepts fully that all caves are intrinsically dangerous, but we do normally take measures to prevent hazards over which the caver has no control and the case of flooding at Mossdale Caverns is, in my opinion, one such situation.

In presenting this account of the disaster at Mossdale, I have tried to be accurate as to events, and I am grateful to Mr. Len Huff of the U.W.F.R.A. for the use of his official report of the operation. Such errors and omissions as I am sure exist are my own failing. There will be some who will find such an account distasteful, and feel that such tragic events are best left unrecorded except in the specialised records of the participant organisations. I cannot accept this view; and hope that we can learn from what has happened. All of us who were personally involved with this disaster are certainly much sadder, whether we are much wiser remains to be seen.

Note of the Author; Dr, Fincham has been a Wessex member for many years; is a past President of the Leeds University Speleological Society, and Chairman of the Leeds Area Team of the Cave Rescue Organisation.
Wessex Cave Club Journal No. 116, Vol 10. April 1968